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Abstract 
Foreign bank presence has substantially increased in Latin America during the second half of 
the 1990s, which has prompted an intense debate on its banking and macroeconomic 
consequences. In this paper, we apply ARCH techniques to jointly estimate the impact of 
foreign bank presence on the level and volatility of real credit in a panel of eight Latin 
American countries, using quarterly data over the period 1995:1-2001:4. Results show that, 
together with financial development, foreign bank presence has contributed to reduce real credit 
volatility, improving the buffer shock function of the banking sector. This finding is consistent 
with the fact that foreign banks are typically well diversified institutions holding higher quality 
assets and having access to a broad set of liquidity sources.  
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1 Introduction 
Foreign bank entry into developing countries has exploded since the 1990s, a trend that 
had been dominated in the previous decade by cross-border lending activities. 
International banking institutions have expanded their presence in several emerging 
market economies by establishing branches and subsidiaries, favoured by the 
liberalization of external sectors and the embracement of market-friendly policy 
reforms, including deregulation and privatization of the banking sector. Two regions 
that have been very active in attracting foreign direct investment into the banking 
industry have been Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In the Middle East and North Africa, foreign bank presence has increased at 
a generally slower pace, while it remained stagnant or even declined in South and East 
Asia and the Pacific regions (Figure 1). 
This unprecedented internationalization of the banking sector has prompted a debate on 
the potential consequences for the recipient countries. Multinational banks are likely to 
introduce better practices, and better risk evaluation and information technologies, 
helping boost the efficiency and diversification of banking services in host countries 
(Levine 1997; Goldberg 2007). They are also thought to have the potential to ameliorate 
emerging countries’ banking regulation and supervision (Goldberg 2007). Moreover, 
they may lead to greater competition in markets that had been captured by domestic 
institutions, which should reduce banking costs and increase the overall efficiency of 
the system (Berger and Hannan 1989; Hannan 1991; Claessens et al. 2001; Corvoisier 
and Gropp 2002; Evanoff and Ors 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2003). However, foreign 
banks may limit lending to small and medium-size enterprises (Berger et al. 2001), by 
attracting mainly the wealthier customers and leaving the riskiest borrowers to local 
banks, then weakening domestic banks (Claessens and Jansen 2000; Barajas et al. 2000; 
Detragiache et al. 2006). 
Against this background, the present paper uses aggregate data to investigate the impact 
of foreign bank presence on credit volatility in a panel of eight Latin American 
countries during the period 1995-2001. The literature on the internationalization of the 
banking sector and the implications for banking and macroeconomic stability is 
inconclusive in this respect. There are those who argue that foreign banks are more 
likely to be fickle lenders, since they have better access to alternative business 
opportunities than domestic banks (Galindo et al. 2005). Moreover, they could 
potentially import shocks from their home countries, then contributing to destabilize 
domestic banking systems (Goldberg 2002; Martinez Peria et al. 2005). However, 
foreign banks may increase the buffer shock function of the banking sector in case of 
negative shocks, because they are typically well-diversified institutions with access to a 
broader set of liquidity sources (Detragiache and Gupta 2006; De Haas and Van 
Lelyveld 2006). Multinational banks may also allow for a faster recapitalization of local 
banks after a crisis, as was the case following the Mexican, Brazilian and Argentinean 
banking crisis of the 1990s (Peek and Rosengren 2000a). Finally, due to superior risk 
evaluation systems, better screening devices and home country supervision, foreign 
banks are likely to hold better quality assets (Crystal et al. 2001), and have the potential 
to avoid capital flight in case of domestic shocks (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2004; 
Peek and Rosengreen 2000a). 
Most of the applied papers on the link between foreign banks and stability of different 
macroeconomic aggregates are grounded on econometric models that analyse the first 
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conditional moment, i.e. the mean, of the dependent variable (Micco and Panizza 2006; 
Galindo et al. 2005; Dages et al. 2000). The only study that has tried to account for the 
second conditional moment of the data, i.e. volatility, has done so using two-step 
methods, which are known to be inefficient (Morgan and Strahan 2003). We deviate 
from the previous empirical literature in that we apply ARCH techniques to model 
jointly the first and second conditional moment of real domestic credit. In order to shed 
light on the issue of credit volatility, the ARCH equation is extended to include the 
degree of development of the banking sector and the internationalization of the banking 
system among a broader set of regressors. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the 
first time that such tools are used to analyse the impact of foreign bank presence on 
macroeconomic volatility.  
The main findings of the paper regarding credit volatility are as follows: (i) perhaps not 
surprisingly, banking crisis steeped-up real credit volatility, with public and foreign 
banks having no discernible effect (positive or negative) during these stressful periods; 
(ii) deeper banking systems result in lower credit volatility, a finding that is coherent 
with Denizer et al. (2002) for other macroeconomic variables, such as consumption, 
investment and real GDP; (iii) stabilizing effects predominate in a such a way that 
foreign bank presence reduced credit volatility in our panel of eight Latin American 
countries over the period 1995-2001. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of theoretical considerations underlining the link between foreign direct 
investment in the banking sector and macroeconomic volatility. Section III details the 
data construction process, and Section IV presents the ARCH econometric model used 
in the estimations. Panel unit root tests are exposed in Section V, while Section VI 
describes the estimation results. Section VII concludes.  
2 Foreign banks and volatility: a review of the literature 
The theoretical literature examining the link between foreign direct investment in the 
banking sector and macroeconomic stability is rather limited. To the knowledge of the 
authors, only two studies deal with such an issue: Morgan et al. (2004), who design a 
banking model with capital-constrained intermediaries, and Galindo et al. (2005), who 
use a portfolio model. In both cases, foreign bank presence has contradictory effects on 
volatility, depending on the type of shock hitting the economy. 
Morgan et al. (2004) (MSR) extend to two countries the banking model originally 
developed by Holmström and Tirole (1997) (HT) for a closed economy. The HT 
approach emphasizes that the banking system may become a separate channel of shocks 
transmission, apart from macroeconomic spillovers, such as changes in the monetary 
stance or exchange rate policy. In the model, firms have to choose between two sources 
of financing: bank or investors capital, which are not perfectly substitutable. Bank 
capital is the most expensive, because banks provide not only loans but also valuable 
monitoring services. Banks monitor investment projects by firms, financed by other 
firms in the economy, the banks and investors. For this reason, bank capital is called 
‘informed capital’, while investor capital (not subject to monitoring) is called 
‘uninformed capital’. Capital-constrained banking intermediaries are cardinal in this set 
up, since firms depend on their collateral (or capital) value to first raise bank 
(‘informed’) capital, in order to be able to have access to the much cheaper investor 
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(‘uninformed’) capital. Indeed, the banking system may become a main source of 
instability in the economy, since any shock on banks will have immediate real effects on 
economic activity.  
MSR extend the HT model to include another country, and let bank capital to be freely 
distributed between countries, while the amount of firm capital in each individual 
country is fixed. This set up is appropriate to study how bank capital shocks (financial 
shocks) and firm capital shocks (real or collateral shocks) affect the distribution of bank 
capital between countries, under an internationally integrated banking system. 
Uninformed investors in both countries have access to a worldwide securities market, 
with a quasi-unlimited supply of investment opportunities (the securities market rate of 
return is exogenous, equal in both countries and independent of country-specific 
shocks). 
To isolate the effect of banking integration on economic volatility, MSR compare the 
impact of bank and firm capital shocks over credit and investment, both under an 
integrated and a national banking system. Indeed, suppose there is a negative bank 
capital shock in one of the countries. The impact on the amount of uninformed and 
informed capital invested in the affected country is smaller when the banking system is 
internationally integrated. Bank (informed) capital declines less in an integrated system 
because after a negative bank capital shock, its rate of return increases, attracting bank 
capital from the unaffected country and buffering the negative initial effect. The smaller 
reduction in informed capital, induces in turn a smaller contraction in investor 
(uninformed) capital. Given that banks monitor firms, bank capital constitutes a signal 
that firms exploit in order to attract investor capital. Consequently, in the case of a 
negative bank-capital shock, a multinational banking system helps promoting the 
stability of total credit and investment in the economy. 
In contrast, the negative impact of a firm collateral shock is amplified under a 
multinational system. As before, two mechanisms are at play. First, the lower value of 
firm collateral decreases the bank capital rate of return after a negative shock in an 
integrated banking system. Therefore, banks will prefer lending their mobile capital in 
the unaffected country, where the bank capital rate of return is higher, and firms are 
backed by better collateral. As a consequence, bank capital is reduced in comparison 
with a national system, because in this case bank capital is immobile. Negative firm-
capital shocks end in turn in larger declines of investor capital in an integrated banking 
system. As before, the supply of uninformed capital depends on the firms’ ability to 
leverage bank capital, which is directly linked to firm collateral. Therefore, bank credit 
and investment suffer more in a multinational banking system when negative firm-
collateral shocks hit the economy. 
Galindo et al. (2005) (GMP) extend Pyle’s (1971) portfolio model to many countries, to 
examine the behaviour of well diversified banks across nations in case of shocks to the 
host country. In their theoretical model, banks in each country have deposits and assets. 
They show that credit from well diversified foreign banks will be more stable when 
liquidity shocks (i.e., shocks to funding costs) hit the economy. In fact, multinational 
banks have access to a global pool of liquidity, so they may be less sensitive to a rise in 
deposit interest rates than domestic banks. In contrast, foreign banks may react more 
aggressively in the case of opportunity shocks (i.e., shocks to expected returns), 
worsening the impact of globalization on banking stability in the host country. A 
worldwide diversified bank is able to rapidly withdraw investments from a host country 
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when there is a decline in expected returns, reassigning the capital to that part of the 
world with better economic prospects. 
All in all, from the theoretical literature it seems clear that the final effect of foreign 
financial institutions on macroeconomic volatility depends on the type of shocks hitting 
the economy. In the MSR model, banking integration reduces credit and investment 
volatility under bank-capital shocks, but it increases it under firm-collateral shocks. In 
the GMP model, foreign banks may bring rewards in terms of greater stability when 
funding costs are affected in the host country, but may cause instability in the face of 
host opportunity shocks. Of course, the overall impact of banking integration on 
volatility is an empirical question, not free from implementation difficulties. As such, it 
is very hard to identify and isolate the types of shocks discussed above. These caveats, 
coupled with data availability problems have lead researchers to focus attention on the 
statistical significance of aggregate measures of foreign bank presence. If banking 
integration is not significant, this means that the stabilizing and destabilizing effects 
compensate each other, while if it is negatively signed and statistically significant at 
conventional statistical levels, stabilizing effects predominate and foreign banks 
improve the buffer function of the financial system. Indeed, we will use ARCH 
techniques to model together the determinants of the level and volatility of credit, and 
testing for the significance of foreign bank presence as a regressor in the variance 
equation. 
3 The data 
Our sample of Latin American countries includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, selection based on data availability. Aggregate 
information is quarterly and spans the period 1995:1-2001:4, for which a balanced panel 
is available.1 As a consequence, we have 28 quarters and 8 countries resulting in 224 
observations. Banking information was kindly provided by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), while macroeconomic data are available from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and national sources (i.e., central banks and national 
institutes of statistics). 
Banking data were built using balance sheets of local financial institutions that report to 
the appropriate regulatory agency, and consist of a measure of foreign and public bank 
presence, and concentration of the banking system. Each bank is classified according to 
capital ownership in public and private, domestic, regional or foreign. Foreign Banks 
are those with more than 50 per cent of the capital owned by a G10 country. Some of 
the countries in the sample also host banks from other Latin American countries 
(regional banks). As in Galindo et al. (2005), we treat them as domestic banks, because 
the authors find that they behave like domestic than global well-diversified banks. We 
consider state-owned banks to be those with most of the capital in hands of the 
government. Using this classification, the measure of foreign- and public-banks 
presence is defined as their respective credit shares in the whole system. The measure of 
credit considered is direct credit by banks to private and public, non-financial 
                                                 
1 While for most of the countries banking data were available on a monthly basis, for Chile and 
Mexico data were only available at a quarterly frequency. Excluding these countries from the sample 
would have entailed a major loss, since these countries have been very active in attracting foreign banks.  
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institutions. Finally, the degree of concentration in the system is captured by the share 
of credits granted by the three largest banks over the total stock of credit. 
As mentioned in the introduction, foreign banks have been very active in Latin America 
over the estimation sample, allowing assessing their impact on credit behaviour. The 
data show that foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Latin American banking sector 
was mainly encouraged by the process of deregulation and privatization of this industry 
that took place during the 1990s. As a result, the share of foreign banks on total credit 
more than doubled in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru between 1995 and 
2001 (Figure 2).2 This is against a slight increase in banking concentration over the 
region, with the exception of Brazil and Chile, where concentration has been reduced 
(Figure 3). 
Macroeconomic data deemed relevant for the analysis consist of seasonally-adjusted 
real credit to the private sector by banking institutions (the dependent variable), 
seasonally-adjusted real domestic GDP, seasonally-adjusted U.S. real GDP, the Federal 
Funds Rate, the domestic fiscal balance, the spread between lending and borrowing 
rates, the degree of financial development, the bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S., 
and measures of banking and currency crisis. 
Quarterly real credit is computed as the nominal credit stock average over the three 
months, deflated by the CPI. The Federal Funds Rate is expressed as per cent per 
annum, while the fiscal balance is computed as the four-quarter rolling-sum of the 
headline central government balance, over nominal GDP. The spread uses interest rates 
for local currency operations (in per cent per annum), and is computed as the difference 
between the lending and deposit rates, as a ratio to the deposit rate. Financial 
development in the economy is expressed as the percentage of the stock of total (public 
plus private) credit over GDP. The bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S. is 
computed using market nominal exchange rates (in national currency per U.S. dollar) 
and seasonally-adjusted consumer price indices. The banking crisis variable is a dummy 
that takes the value of one for each quarter of the year in which there was a banking 
crisis. Systemic banking crisis for 93 countries over the period 1970-2000 are dated in 
Caprio et al. (2005), while for 2001 we used information provided by Carstens et al. 
(2004). Finally, a proxy for a currency crisis was constructed based on Frankel and Rose 
(1996). Indeed, our currency crisis index takes a value of one if depreciation in a given 
quarter is higher than 10 per cent, which is in turn at least five percentage points higher 
than the depreciation of the previous quarter (Table 1). 
4 The econometric model 
Our interest lies in identifying the impact of foreign bank presence on credit volatility, 
controlling for additional factors affecting the mean and conditional variance of credit. 
The ARCH family models are particularly suitable for this purpose, since they allow 
estimating jointly the determinants of both the first and the second conditional moment 
of the data. Surprisingly, none of the studies on the subject has made use of this 
methodology. 
                                                 
2 A similar pattern emerges when assets, instead of credit, are used to measure foreign participation. 
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The econometric model to be estimated consists of the following equations: 
'
0 1 1 , 1,..., , 1,...,it it it i ity y X u i N t Tβ φ β μ−= + + + + = =    (1) 
itititu ησ=          (2) 
( ) 2 11'02 exp −++= ititiit uz αλλσ        (3) 
)1,0(~ Nitη          (4) 
In the mean equation (1), yit is the dependent variable, µi is an individual, country-
specific fixed effect, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, β0 denotes the constant 
term, β1 is a set of coefficients, uit is a disturbance term, and N and T are the number of 
cross-sectional units and time periods in the panel, respectively. Equation (2) states the 
country-specific shock to follow an ARCH process. In equation (3), the conditional 
variance, λ0i is an individual, country-specific fixed effect, while Zit is a vector of 
explanatory variables.3 Together, equations (1)-(4) constitute a panel ARMAX-ARCH 
model, which is estimated by quasi-maximum-likelihood techniques.4 
The vector of macroeconomic explanatory variables assumed to affect credit dynamics 
in equation (1) includes real domestic GDP, the U.S. GDP, the Federal Funds Rate, the 
domestic fiscal balance, the spread between lending and borrowing rates, the bilateral 
real exchange rate with the U.S., and a measure of currency crisis. The lagged 
dependent variable is introduced in the regression to control for persistence in the level 
of private credit. 
We expect banking lending to be procyclical, both with respect to local and 
international economic activity.5 A higher foreign GDP captures a more benign 
international context, then leading to higher credit in domestic markets. We also expect 
increases in the international cost of money, measured by the Federal Funds Rate, to 
lead to a less buoyant credit activity in domestic economies. In the same vein should 
play increases in the real exchange rate, since they can be considered as another 
component of international lending costs (Dornbusch 1983). When the real exchange 
rate depreciates, the repayment of foreign loans becomes more expensive, making them 
less attractive. This may be a potential important channel of credit contraction in 
domestic markets since banks in the region have been extensively issuing foreign debt 
as a way of funding domestic lending operations. 
With respect to the fiscal balance, the banking sector has proved to be a large provider 
of governmental funding in the countries under consideration. It would then be expected 
that better public account positions would crowd-in private credit. A higher interest rate 
                                                 
3 As usual, country specific fixed effects in the mean and conditional variance equation are intended 
to capture differences in institutions, regulations, culture and other economic factors not accounted for the 
explanatory variables. 
4 Note that we estimate an ARCH(1) instead of a higher order or GARCH(p) model in order to keep 
the model as parsimonious as possible. Of course, residual diagnostic tests will indicate whether or not 
this model specification is appropriate. 
5 See Horvath et al. (2002) and Goldberg (2007) for a revision of the theoretical literature on 
procyclical credit behaviour. 
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spread should negatively affect credit, by making fewer projects economically viable. A 
priori, we might expect currency crisis episodes in a particular country to be 
accompanied by a decline in banking lending, since they are associated with general 
losses of confidence in the system and a retrenching in deposits. 
The banking variables assumed to enter the mean equation are the degree of financial 
development, the presence of public and foreign banks in the system, and the level of 
concentration. The inclusion of financial development in the mean equation is intended 
to capture the extent of financial market imperfections (information asymmetries, 
monitoring capacity, etc.). Aghion et al. (1999) develop a macroeconomic model based 
on micro foundations which combines financial market imperfections and unequal 
access to investment opportunities. They show that economies with less developed 
financial systems will tend to be more volatile (justifying the inclusion of financial 
development in the variance equation – see below), and will experience slower growth. 
Regarding foreign bank presence, empirical evidence is inconclusive up to the impact of 
foreign banks on credit dynamism. While Crystal et al. (2002) have found a positive 
effect (with foreign banks exhibiting a more robust loan growth than their national 
counterparts in a sample of Latin American countries over the second half of the 1990s), 
Detragiache et al. (2006) show that in poorer countries a stronger foreign bank presence 
is robustly associated with a slower credit growth to the private sector.6 Finally, a more 
concentrated banking system is expected to reduce credit dynamism, because dominant 
players have much at stake in the event of negative shocks, then reducing risk taking 
behaviour and credit growth (Morgan and Strahan 2003). 
Both theory and evidence highlight the importance of including interaction terms in 
equation (1) to account for the potential asymmetric behaviour of public and foreign 
banks in the event of crisis and external and internal shocks. For example, Micco and 
Panizza (2006) find that state-owned banks may play a useful credit-smoothing role 
because their lending is less responsive to macroeconomic shocks than lending by 
private banks. Regarding foreign banks, the empirical literature gives conflicting results 
as to whether or not they exacerbate credit expansions and contractions. Some empirical 
studies analysing cross border lending from international banks to developing countries 
show a positive relationship between the host country business cycles and international 
lending behaviour. Indeed, multinational banks may reduce lending to host countries 
which face economic difficulties, to reallocate their capital over markets with better 
economic prospects (Dahl and Shrieves 1999; Buch 2000; Jenneau and Micu 2002; 
Morgan and Strahan 2003). However, Micco and Panizza (2006) find that foreign banks 
have not contributed to exacerbating lending cyclicality in a sample of developing and 
developed countries over the period 1995-2002. Studies on foreign banks behaviour 
during financial crisis in host countries point that, internationally-diversified and more 
capitalized foreign banks did not reduce credit supply in periods of financial distress, 
contributing to greater credit stability (Dages et al. 2000; Peek and Rosengren 2000a; 
                                                 
6 This could be the case because of a ‘cherry picking’ behaviour. 
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Crystal et al. 2002; and Goldberg 2002).7 Foreign banks might view crises as an 
opportunity to expand, then increasing their local market share.8  
An internationally integrated banking system may also shape the way external interest 
rates and GDP shocks affect lending behaviour. For example, in the event of a Federal 
Funds Rate increase, these institutions may exacerbate the ‘flight to quality’ effect. 
Regarding foreign GDP, the literature gives conflicting results on the impact on credit 
by foreign banks and cross border lending. On the one hand, authors like Moshiriam 
(2001), Martinez Peria et al. (2005) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) find a 
negative push relationship between the home country economic cycle and cross-border 
and foreign-bank lending in host countries. Parent banks can expand their activities in 
the host country when facing worsening economic conditions in their own market, as a 
way to seek for external lending opportunities and boost profits. On the other hand, 
Dahl and Shrieves (1999) and Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000b) find evidence of a 
positive push relationship between the home country economic cycle and cross-border 
and foreign-bank lending in host countries. The authors argue that this may be the case 
because economic turmoil in the home country can lead to deterioration in the parent’s 
bank financial conditions, making them reduce foreign subsidiaries’ activities. 
Empirical evidence for the region seems to go in this direction, since Goldberg (2002) 
observes that U.S. bank claims to Latin American countries increase as the U.S. 
economy grows faster. 
4.1 The potential determinants of credit volatility 
Regarding the variables in the conditional variance equation (3), we include those that 
have been assumed by the literature to have a burden on credit volatility. These are 
banking and currency crisis, the presence of foreign and state-owned banks, financial 
development and the degree of concentration in the banking system. While we expect 
crisis to be positively related to credit volatility, the impact of foreign bank presence is 
uncertain. It was mentioned before that from the theoretical literature the final effect of 
foreign financial institutions on macroeconomic volatility depends on the type of shocks 
hitting the economy, which are in practice extremely difficult to isolate. An overall 
measure of foreign bank presence is then included in the conditional variance equation. 
If stabilizing effects predominate, then its coefficient should be negatively signed and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Regarding financial development and volatility, the literature points many channels by 
which the banking system may contribute to reduce macroeconomic volatility. Deeper 
financial markets may be more efficient in matching savers and investors, then allowing 
for a smoother absorption of shocks (Aghion et al. 1999). Moreover, the financial sector 
may also facilitate risk diversification, both at the micro and macroeconomic level, 
which would in turn reduce volatility. Another channel runs through the positive link 
between asymmetric information and output volatility. As far as the level of financial 
development is related to the ability of economies to generate and process information, 
                                                 
7 De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) and Kraft (2002) find similar results for eastern European 
countries, while Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998), Levine (1999) and Martinez Peria et al. (2005) find a 
similar conclusion studding cross-country experiences. 
8 Apart from maintaining or increasing lending in crisis periods, another way to gain market share 
consists of acquiring local private banks. See Cull and Martinez Peria (2007). 
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a negative relationship between financial market development and volatility would be 
expected.9 
As with foreign bank presence, banking concentration may either increase or reduce 
credit volatility. On one side, higher concentration levels may imply less competition 
and higher profits. The resulting increase in banking franchise values boosts their 
incentives to make good loans, thus avoiding investing in more speculative assets, and 
rendering the system more stable.10 On the other side, more powerful institutions have 
the ability to charge higher interest rates to their customers, encouraging risk taking 
behaviour, and leading to greater vulnerabilities in the system (Boyd and De Nicoló 
2005). Also, more concentrated banking systems are likely to induce moral hazard 
behaviour because concentrated banks are ‘too important to fail’ (Mishkin 1999). All in 
all, risk taking behaviour increases, which results in more vulnerable banks.11 
Morgan and Strahan (2003) have already tested the impact of foreign bank entry, 
financial development and banking concentration on economic volatility, measured by 
the squared and absolute value deviation of actual from expected GDP and investment 
growth.12 For the full sample, they find tentative evidence of a positive link between 
foreign bank presence and economic volatility. Concentration is not statistically 
significative, and financial development is found to increase economic volatility, which 
is puzzling both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Nevertheless, when they focus on 
a sample of Latin American countries, they obtain a negative coefficient in the GDP 
regression for both banking integration and financial development, although they are not 
statistically significant. Denizer et al. (2002) find evidence that financial deepness helps 
to reduce economic volatility, using a panel of 70 developed and developing countries 
starting in the mid-1950s. They find that financial development reduces per capita 
consumption, investment and income volatility growth. In the same direction, by 
studying bank-specific data on lending behaviour by domestically- and foreign-owned 
banks in Argentina and Mexico, Dages et al. (2000) find that foreign banks generally 
had higher loan growth rates than their domestically-owned counterparts, with lower 
volatility of lending, contributing to lower overall volatility of credit. Interaction terms 
between the crisis variables and foreign and state-owned banks are also included in the 
variance equation, to determine if these types of banks act as volatility absorbers or 
amplifiers. 
                                                 
9 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997) for theoretical models formalizing the abovementioned hypothesis. See Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994) and Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) for empirical evidence using microeconomic data. 
10 See Allen and Gale (2004) and Boot and Greenbaum (1993) for theoretical models on banking 
concentration and credit stability. Empirical work was conducted by Paroush (1995), Benston et al. 
(1995), and more recently Beck et al. (2005). On the relationship between franchise value (i.e., the present 
value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn), and risk see Keeley (1990), Demsetz et al. 
(1996), Hellman et al. (2000), and Bergstresser (2001). 
11 Empirical evidence around these lines is presented by Boyd and Graham (1991, 1996), De Nicoló 
and Kwast (2002), and de Nicoló et al. (2004). 
12 Expected GDP and investment growth is computed from a regression on time and fixed effects, 
banking integration, as well as a set of control variables. The sample consists of a panel of nearly 100 
countries and spans the period 1990-1997. 
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5 Panel unit root tests 
Financial sector foreign direct investment in Latin America is a relatively new 
phenomenon, putting a burden on data availability and invalidating the use of time 
series techniques applied to individual countries. The usage of panel data that pools 
together information for different cross-sectional units increases the amount of 
information and the power of econometric estimations. Nevertheless, the usual concerns 
about nonsense spurious regressions and misleading statistical inferences still arise 
when using potential non-stationary panels, in which the time dimension exceeds by far 
the number of cross-sectional units. Indeed, checking the panel unit-root properties of 
the variables will be an ineluctable step in disentangling the effect that foreign banks 
may have on credit volatility in our sample of Latin American countries. 
The number of tests to detect the presence of unit-roots in panels has been growing 
rapidly over the recent past. First generation techniques have ignored the possibility that 
unobserved common factors can affect the cross-section units simultaneously. This 
possibility can easily arise in macroeconomic applications that use country or regional 
data, substantially biasing the estimated coefficients and distorting the size of the test 
statistics. In particular, Pesaran (2007) shows that in the presence of high cross-sectional 
dependence, the bias is such that the empirical size is higher than the nominal size.13 
Recognizing this deficiency, a second group of panel tests have been proposed to 
successfully address this issue (see Breitung and Pesaran 2006, for a literature review). 
Nevertheless, the unwarranted application of these techniques does not go without 
difficulties. If panel unit root tests that allow for cross-section dependence are used 
when this is not high, tests might result in a loss of power. 
Therefore, before deriving any inference on the statistical properties of the data it is 
necessary to establish whether or not the variables in the panel are subject to a 
significant degree of error cross-section dependence. This can be achieved by 
conducting first generation panel unit root tests, obtaining the residuals of each 
equation, and then computing the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test suggested by Breusch 
and Pagan (1980). The LM statistics tests the null hypothesis of zero cross-equation 
error correlations, and is based on the average of the squared pair-wise sample 
correlation of the residuals ( ,ˆi jρ ).14 The test is given by: 
1
2
,
1 1
ˆ
N N
lm i j
i j i
CD T ρ−
= = +
= ∑ ∑  
Under the null hypothesis of no cross section dependence, the statistics converges to a 
chi-squared distribution with N(N –1)/2 degrees of freedom. This test has been shown to 
                                                 
13 The extent of over rejection increases with the degree of cross-sectional dependence, and with N and 
T. 
14 Specifically, 
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⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑ , where ,i te  is the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimate of the error equation used to test for unit roots for each i separately. 
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be especially suitable for cases in which N is sufficiently small relative to T, as in our 
case.15 
Choi’s (2001) test is used to determine the existence of panel unit roots, assuming that 
the individual time series are cross-sectionally independent. While the test can be 
constructed by applying any unit root test to the individual series, here we estimate 
standard ADF regressions for each cross-section unit and combine the p-values 
associated with each lagged dependent variable so as to form the following statistics: 
( )1
1
1 N
i
i
Z p
N
−
=
= Φ∑  
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and pi is the 
asymptotic p-value for the ADF unit root test of cross section i. The null hypothesis is 
that all times series have a unit-root, while under the alternative hypothesis some of the 
variables are stationary. Choi (2001) shows that under the null hypothesis, Z converges 
to a standard normal distribution. A main advantage is its improved finite sample power 
over other traditional techniques, like Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003). 
The panel unit root test that allows for cross-sectional dependence is constructed around 
the same lines as before, the only difference being the ADF regression used to obtain 
the p-values and the fact that the Z statistics does not converge any more to a standard 
normal distribution, even for large T and N. In such a case, stochastically simulated 
critical values have to be used.16 Pesaran (2007) proposed an easy way to deal with the 
problem of cross-sectional correlation arising from an unobserved common factor, 
which consists of simply augmenting the standard ADF regression with cross-section 
averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series. In particular, the 
Z test will be constructed now using the OLS p-values associated to coefficient βi in the 
following thp  order regression: 
∑ ∑
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−−−− +Δ+Δ+++=Δ
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j
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where ty  is the cross-section mean of yit given by ∑
=
−=
N
i
itt yNy
1
1 , and m = 1,2,3, with 
}{1 φ=td , }1{2 =td  and },1{3 td t = .17 Simulations performed by Pesaran show that the 
cross-sectionally augmented version of Choi’s test has quite satisfactory power and size, 
even for small values of T and N. 
                                                 
15 Pesaran (2004) has proposed another test for cross section dependence, using the level rather than 
the squared values of the pair-wise correlation coefficients. By using Pesaran’s test, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that positive and negative correlations compensate each other, leading to the erroneous 
inference that no cross-sectional dependence is present in the data. 
16 These depend on the sample size (T and N), and on the deterministic components included in the 
regressions. 
17 The augmentation order p is selected here on account of the Schwartz Information Criterion applied 
to each cross section ADF equation, without the cross-section variables 1−ty  and jty −Δ , j = 1,…,pi. 
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Table 2 shows the cross-sectional dependence and panel unit root test results for the 
abovementioned set of variables over the period 1995:1-2001:4. Recognizing that 
potential biases may arise when including different deterministic components in the 
estimating unit root equations, we have adopted the following strategy. Country-
variables that do not exhibit a trend were centred, and no deterministics at all were 
included in the analysis, which allows for testing the null of a random walk without drift 
process against the alternative of the variable being level stationarity. When country-
variables do exhibit a trend, models with a constant, and with and without a linear time 
trend were estimated. Only if the null hypothesis is not rejected in both cases, then we 
can be confident that a unit root is present in the data. Indeed, column 1 contains 
variable’s names, column 2 indicates the cases in which some of the equations include a 
constant only, while column 3 presents those in which the same set of equations was 
extended to include a linear trend. 
The test of cross-section dependence performed on the residuals of the ADF estimations 
that do not contain averages of the dependent variable are reported in column 4. May be 
not surprisingly, significant dependence across countries was found in macroeconomic 
variables like real GDP, the fiscal balance, real private lending and real exchange rates. 
In contrast, most of the banking variables are free of common factors that may make 
them to be highly correlated. The last column of Table 2 presents the results of the Z 
statistics, with or without cross section dependence according to the results obtained by 
the lmCD  statistics presented before.18 For almost all the variables it is possible to reject 
the unit root null, while for real GDP the test gives conflicting results. Somewhat 
expectedly for trendy variables, the unit root null is not rejected when only a constant is 
included in the equation while it is rejected when a trend is added.19 Individual unit root 
tests results for the U.S. real GDP and the Federal Funds Rate (not reported) do not 
allow rejecting the presence of a unit root in the series. 
Based on these results, variables are transformed accordingly. In particular, when the 
unit root is rejected and variables are expressed as shares (like foreign bank presence, 
concentration, etc.), the level difference with respect to the HP trend is considered. And 
when they are not, the percentage deviation with respect to the trend is used instead. Of 
course, when a unit root is present, the variables are differentiated.20 Finally, in the case 
of the real GDP in which results are not conclusive, estimations are carried out under 
both types of transformation, to ensure the robustness of the econometric results. 
                                                 
18 Accordingly, when the lmCD statistics does not reject the null, the unit root test that excludes cross-
section averages was used. 
19 This means the test has difficulties in discerning whether the series is trend stationary or random 
walk with drift. 
20 Panel unit root tests (not reported) performed on the transformed variables reject the unit root null in 
all cases. 
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6 Estimation results 
6.1 The econometric methodology 
This section presents the steps followed to estimate the model, selecting among a set of 
variables those significant at conventional statistical levels, while a more detailed 
analysis of the role played by interaction terms in the mean equation is presented in 
Annex I, following a particular to general strategy.21 To choose the final specification 
for the model, we preliminary identify the presence of fixed effects in the mean and 
variance equation, we test for poolability of the data (i.e., that coefficients in the mean 
equation are the same across countries), and we identify the presence of ARCH effects 
in the conditional covariance equation. 
Indeed, we begin by estimating the mean equation by OLS and testing for the presence 
of fixed effects using a Chow test, assuming that the data are poolable. In particular, we 
test for the null hypothesis that all the individual fixed dummy variables included in 
equation (1) are zero: 0 1 2 1: 0NH μ μ μ −= = ⋅⋅⋅ = = . The Chow test is just an F-test for 
the joint significance of these dummies and is computed as: 
( ) ( )
( )KNNTURSS
1NURSSRRSS
F0 −−
−−= ~ ( ) K1TN,1NF −−−  
where N and T are the cross and time series dimension respectively, K is the number of 
coefficients, excluding the dummy variables and the constant, RRSS is the residual sum 
of squares of the restricted model (i.e., the pooled OLS), and URSS is the residual sum 
of squares of the unrestricted model (i.e., the OLS model that includes the fixed effects 
dummy variables). 
Once we have decided on the inclusion of fixed effects dummy variables, we proceeded 
to test for poolability of the data in the estimated equation. Again, this is performed 
using a Chow statistics to test the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal 
among the cross-sectional units. The statistic is defined as: 
( ) ( )
( )'KTNURSS
'K1NURSSRRSS
F0 −
−−= ~ ( ) ( )'KTN,'K1NF −−  
where ' 1K K= + . The RRSS is given by the OLS estimation performed on the pooled 
model (i.e., assuming homogenous coefficients), whereas the unrestricted residual sum 
of squares (URSS) is the sum of the residual squares performed on each separate 
country-specific OLS regression (i.e., assuming a different coefficient for each country 
equation). 
The next step consisted in using the residuals of the previously estimated mean equation 
to test for the presence of fixed effects in the conditional variance. In particular, we ran 
a regression of the form: 
                                                 
21 Results presented in Annex I are also used as a guide to choose the most general model estimated in 
this section. 
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and tested for the joint significance of μi using the same Chow test as before, for a given 
value p. Once we have decided on the inclusion of fixed effects in the conditional 
variance, we proceeded to test for the presence of ARCH effects (i.e., the significance of 
αj’s). The null hypothesis is then that no ARCH effects are present in the model. 
Once the model’s specification has been determined, equations (1)-(4) were estimated 
jointly using maximum likelihood techniques, including different sets of explanatory 
variables in the variance equation. To avoid potential endogeneity problems, lagged 
domestic variables are introduced in both the mean and variance equations. Indeed, we 
measure the impact of previous values of the variables on subsequent credit behaviour. 
The exceptions are the currency and banking crisis dummies and the foreign variables 
(U.S. GDP and the Federal Funds Rate), which are included in contemporaneous form. 
6.2 The determinants of credit behaviour: the mean equation 
Model (1) in Table 3 presents the results for the most general estimation performed on 
the mean equation, while model (2) excludes the insignificant variables at conventional 
statistical levels.22 In both estimations, the null hypothesis of absence of fixed effects in 
the mean equation is not rejected, suggesting that fixed effects are not present in the 
data. The same results hold true for the null of poolability, suggesting that coefficients 
are significantly equal across countries, justifying the standard homogeneity 
assumption. Models (3)-(10) present the same estimation as model (2), the only 
difference being the inclusion of explanatory variables in the variance equation (Table 
4). 
As reported in that Table, tests of fixed effects in the conditional variance do allow 
rejecting the null hypothesis for both models (1) and (2). This is due to the dummy for 
Mexico which is highly significant, while the rest are not statistically different from 
zero. Absence of ARCH effects of order one is rejected at the 10 per cent level, while 
absence of ARCH(4) effects is rejected even at the 1 per cent level in model (2). To 
keep the specifications as parsimonious as possible, all the models are estimated 
including only an ARCH(1) effect in the conditional variance equation, while testing 
whether higher order ARCH effects are present in the residuals.23 
Results for the mean equation show that the autoregressive coefficient is highly 
significant suggesting persistence in the dependent variable.24 Persistence in credit 
behaviour has also been found by Detragiache et al. (2006) for a panel of 89 low income 
and lower middle income countries over the second half of the 1990s. Our estimations 
                                                 
22 Giving that macro variables are very likely to be correlated, then reducing individual significance, a 
larger 10 per cent level was used as a threshold instead of the traditional 5 per cent. 
23 Including a dummy for Mexico in this equation makes the algorithm not to converge. The dummy 
was then not included in the estimations. 
24 Model (2) was re-estimated adding an autoregressive component up to the order four, giving that 
quarterly data is being used in the econometric analysis. Results (not reported) show that only the first 
autoregressive coefficient is statistically significant. 
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also point to a high degree of lending procyclicality, a finding that has also been found 
by Barajas and Steiner (2002) and Arena et al. (2007) for Latin American countries.25 
Results presented in Annex I also point that foreign banks do not contribute to amplify 
credit cycles in the region, given that the interaction between domestic GDP and foreign 
bank presence is not significant. This finding is consistent with Micco and Panizza 
(2006). 
As previously mentioned, push factors like the U.S. GDP and the Federal Funds Rate 
are included to account for the buoyancy of international financial markets. While 
having the expected signs, they are found insignificant at standard statistical levels in 
the econometric estimations. This indicates that mainly pull factors played a role in 
shaping credit behaviour in the second half of the 1990s in our sample of Latin 
American countries.26 Interaction terms between these variables and foreign bank 
presence are not significant, giving no credit to the hypothesis that foreign banks may 
exacerbate external shocks (Annex I). 
Two pull variables which are not significant in the econometric estimation are the fiscal 
balance and the spread between the lending and borrowing rates. It was expected that 
healthier public finances would lead to a crowd-in effect, then boosting domestic loans. 
And higher intermediation costs would make loans more expensive, then reducing the 
stock of credit in the economy. As with the push variables, even when the coefficients 
have the expected signs, they are not significant at conventional statistical levels. 
As hypothesized, the lagged degree of financial development is highly significant, 
pointing that more developed financial systems today (proxying for a lower degree of 
financial imperfections) help to foster real private credit in subsequent periods. As 
expected, the real exchange rate is also significant, showing that depreciations reduce 
credit in domestic economies, because it makes more expensive the repayment of loans 
in foreign currency. This finding is similar to that of Arena et al. (2007) for the same 
region. 
Banking variables including foreign and public bank presence and the degree of 
concentration in the sector do not seem to have a role to play in affecting the level of 
loans granted by the system. As aforementioned, empirical evidence is inconclusive up 
to the impact of foreign banks on credit dynamism. While foreign banks seem to have 
been more active in the granting of loans than their domestic counterparts in Latin 
America over the second half of the 1990s (Crystal et al. 2002), it seems that they 
restrict access to private commercial credit once attention is focused on low income and 
lower middle income countries (Detragiache et al. 2006). These authors also observe 
that the negative effect disappears once mid- and high-income countries are included in 
the sample, a finding which is consistent with the fact that a larger foreign bank 
presence is associated with more, rather than less, private credit in higher income 
economies. In contrast to our findings, the same authors find that state banks lead to a 
slowdown in credit growth, a finding that persists even after including wealthier 
countries in the estimation sample. 
                                                 
25 Similar results are found when the domestic GDP growth is used instead of the HP filtered series. 
26 Since Spanish owned banks account for almost half of total foreign bank lending in the region, the 
American GDP was replaced by the Spanish GDP, but results remained unchanged. 
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Both banking and currency crisis are expected to have a negative effect on credit 
behaviour. During banking crisis generally involving bank runs, deposits are depleted 
putting a burden on the granting of loans. Currency crisis may trigger balance sheet 
effects, leading the banking sector to experience bankruptcy problems. As mentioned 
before, they also tend to be associated with general losses of confidence in the system 
and a retrenching in deposits. Only the currency crisis dummy was found to have the 
expected negative sign while banking crisis does not have a statistically distinguishable 
effect on credit behaviour.27 This might be due to the fact that banking crises tend to 
coincide with deterioration in economic fundamentals making their impact 
indistinguishable from other cyclical downturns. Regarding interaction terms, foreign 
banks do not seem to behave differently than national institutions, both in banking and 
currency crisis (Annex I). Nevertheless, government owned banks do seem to have a 
stabilizing role on credit during banking crisis. A similar result reported by Micco and 
Panizza (2006) states that public-owned banks may play a useful credit-smoothing role, 
because their lending is less responsive to macroeconomic shocks than the lending of 
private banks. 
6.3 The impact of foreign bank presence on credit volatility 
The estimation of the variance equation is presented in Table 4, where different sets of 
explanatory variables susceptible of having a burden on credit volatility are included in 
the analysis. This is a main difference with previous work on the issue of disentangling 
the impact of foreign banks and financial development on macroeconomic volatility, 
since we modelled together the first and second conditional moment of the data, instead 
of using two-step estimators which are known to be inefficient. 
Indeed, in Models (1) and (2) of Table 4, the variance equation only includes an 
ARCH(1) process, significant at the 10 per cent level. Model (3) also includes a dummy 
variable for banking crisis, which proves to be highly significant. Indeed, while periods 
of banking crisis do not seem to have a statistically significant effect on the level of 
credit, they are characterized by a heightened volatility of credit to the private sector. 
Next, we test for a differential behaviour of foreign and state-owned banks during 
financial stress periods, by including, in turn, interaction terms between the dummies 
for banking crisis and foreign and public bank presence. If either one or the other 
exacerbates credit volatility, the coefficient should be positive and statistically 
significant at conventional levels. In the present case, there does not seem to be such 
differential behaviour. In the case of state-owned banks, the conclusion seems to 
support the idea that they have a stabilizing effect during stress periods but only on the 
level of credit (i.e., the first moment of the data). While banking crisis increase credit 
volatility, this does not seem to be true for currency crisis, as shown by Model (6). 
The revision of the theoretical literature presented at the beginning of the paper has 
shown that there is no definite answer to the question of whether or not foreign banks 
raise or reduce credit volatility. Everything depends on the types of shocks hitting the 
economy, which are in practice extremely difficult to isolate. That is why in empirical 
work only an aggregate measure of foreign bank presence is included in the estimations. 
                                                 
27 Note that the banking crisis dummy variable was not included in the general estimation performed in 
Table 3, since it was found to be insignificant in spite of having an expected negative sign in the exercise 
reported in Annex I. 
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If stabilizing effects predominate, then the coefficient should be negatively signed and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. The opposite is of course true when 
foreign banks increase credit volatility. As gauged by the empirical evidence presented 
under Model (7) in Table 4, foreign banks do seem to have contributed to reduce real 
credit volatility in our sample of Latin American countries over the period 1995-2001. 
The coefficient for foreign banks is negative and statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level, which is consistent with Dages et al. (2000) for Argentina and Mexico, who find 
that foreign banks exhibit lower volatility of lending than their domestically-owned 
counterparts, contributing to lower overall credit volatility. 
Of course, it can be argued that foreign bank presence could just be capturing the degree 
of development of the financial sector, or a more concentrated banking system. 
Financial foreign direct investment may help develop the banking sector because 
foreign banks tend to have higher average loan growth rates, higher average 
provisioning expenses and greater loss-absorption capacity (Dages et al. 2000; Crystal 
et al. 2002). As mentioned before, theoretical literature abounds on how a deeper 
financial sector is expected to lead to a more stable macroeconomy. Also, foreign bank 
entry often consists on the buying and merging of local banks, which may result in more 
concentrated banking systems.  
Evidence reported under Model (8) shows that deeper banking systems indeed result in 
lower credit volatility, a finding coherent with Denizer et al. (2002) for other 
macroeconomic variables, like GDP, consumption and investment.28 Including 
concentration among the explanatory variables in the conditional variance does not 
modify the previous findings, both in terms of signs and statistical significance, but 
shows that concentration has no role to play in shaping credit volatility patterns. This 
result is in line with Morgan and Strahan (2003), who found that banking concentration 
does not affect GDP and investment growth volatility in a sample of Latin American 
countries over the period 1990-1997. 
In a last specification, state-owned banks were included in the econometric estimation, 
but proved not to be significant. Indeed, the final specification retained for the 
conditional variance equation is Model (8), in which banking crisis increase real credit 
volatility, while foreign bank entry and banking development reduce such volatility.29 
The diagnostic tests performed on this and the other models show that we can be 
confident about the specification of the econometric equations. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the standardized residuals are normal, as stated by equation (4). 
Also, we test for the correct specification of the mean and variance equations by testing 
for the presence of autocorrelation and conditional heteroscedasticity in the standardized 
residuals. Indeed, we never reject the hypothesis of absence of low and high orders of 
ARCH effects, and while autocorrelation of order four seems to be present in models (1) 
                                                 
28 Note that, due to the positive correlation between foreign bank presence and banking sector 
development, the coefficient for foreign bank penetration is slightly reduced in absolute terms, while 
remaining significant at conventional statistical levels. 
29 To rule out the possibility of reverse causality between foreign bank presence and credit volatility, 
the conditional variance estimated using model (2) was included as a regressor in an equation having 
foreign bank presence as the dependent variable. Credit volatility proved to be insignificant at 
conventional statistical levels. 
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to (7), it disappears once financial development is included among the regressors of the 
conditional variance equation. 
7 Conclusion 
Foreign bank entry into developing countries has exploded since the 1990s, favoured by 
the liberalization of external sectors and the embracement of a series of market-friendly 
policy reforms, including deregulation and privatization of the banking sector. One 
region that has been very active in attracting foreign direct investment into the banking 
industry has been Latin America. This unprecedented internationalization of the 
banking sector has prompted a debate on the potential consequences for the recipient 
countries, in terms of efficiency and diversification of the banking industry, the quality 
of the regulatory environment, and competition and access to banking services by small 
and medium size enterprises, among a broader set of topics studied by the literature. 
Against this background, the present paper has investigated the impact of foreign bank 
presence on real credit volatility in a panel of eight Latin American countries, using 
quarterly data over the period 1995:1-2001:4. We have tried to disentangle the effect of 
foreign banks on credit volatility by using ARCH techniques to model jointly the first 
and second conditional moment of real domestic credit. Indeed, the conditional 
volatility equation is extended to include the degree of development of the banking 
sector and the internationalization of the banking system, among other regressors. To 
the knowledge of the authors, this is the first time that such tools are used to analyse the 
impact of foreign bank presence on macroeconomic volatility. 
The theoretical literature examining the link between foreign direct investment in the 
banking sector and macroeconomic stability is rather limited and does not give a clear 
answer to this issue. Everything depends on the type of shock hitting the economy, and 
indeed, the overall impact of banking integration on volatility is then an empirical 
question. But apart from the theoretical arguments, there are other potential 
explanations of why foreign banks may contribute to credit stability. Foreign banks are 
typically well diversified institutions with access to a broader set of liquidity sources 
than domestic banks. They may also allow for a faster recapitalization of local banks 
after a crisis, and they may have superior risk management systems and better screening 
devices, then improving the quality of their assets. Finally, they have the potential of 
avoiding capital flight in the case of domestic shocks, since people may prefer to 
redirect deposits towards foreign owned institutions, instead of withdrawing the money 
out of the system altogether. This contributes to higher funding and lending stability. 
The main findings of the paper regarding credit volatility are as follows. First and 
perhaps not surprisingly, banking crisis steep up real credit volatility. Public and foreign 
banks do not have a discernible effect (positive or negative) during these stressful 
periods. Second, evidence reported in this paper shows that deeper banking systems 
result in lower credit volatility, a finding that is coherent with Denizer et al. (2002) for 
volatility in other macroeconomic variables. Finally, stabilizing effects predominate in 
such a way that foreign bank presence reduces credit volatility in our panel of eight 
Latin American countries over the period 1995-2001. 
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ANNEX I 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INTERACTION TERMS ON CREDIT 
DYNAMICS 
This Annex presents a particular to general econometric analysis to evaluate the 
importance of interaction terms in shaping the dynamics of the level of real credit (mean 
equation). As such, interaction terms between public/foreign banks, and 
banking/currency crises, and between foreign banks and the Federal Funds Rate and the 
American and domestic GDP are included in the analysis.  
Estimation results of applying this procedure to the panel of eight Latin American 
countries are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2. As in the main text, for each model we 
test for the presence of fixed effects in the mean and variance equation, we test for 
poolability of the data (i.e., that coefficients in the mean equation are the same across 
countries), and we identify the presence of ARCH effects in the conditional covariance 
equation. Empirical evidence shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence 
of fixed effects and poolability of the data in the mean equations for all the estimated 
models. And while we can reject the null of absence of fixed effects in the conditional 
variance equation, this is due to the high significance of the dummy for Mexico.30 
Moreover, as we cannot reject the presence of ARCH effects, the conditional variance 
will be modelled allowing for an autoregressive heteroscedastic process of order one. 
Estimations are then performed using quasi maximum-likelihood techniques. Variables 
are introduced one by one in the mean equation and kept in the next round of 
estimations only when they are significant in the previous step. This allows keeping the 
model as parsimonious as possible, which is of paramount importance to guarantee 
convergence of the estimating algorithm. 
The most parsimonious model that we estimate includes only an autoregressive term 
(Model 1). As it proves to be highly significant, it is kept in the subsequent estimations. 
Note that, while this term always keeps a high degree of significance throughout all the 
models, the absolute value of the coefficient is reduced as we start including extra 
explanatory variables. This is due to the fact that other regressors start capturing part of 
the credit dynamics that was before completely imputed to the autoregressive term.  
The next model includes domestic GDP to capture procyclicality in credit behaviour. 
This variable also proves to be highly significant and positively signed across all the 
estimated models. In Model (3) we test for the impact that foreign bank presence may 
have in amplifying or reducing procyclicality in lending behaviour. If the hypothesis 
that international banking institutions exacerbate procyclicality is not rejected, then an 
interaction term between domestic GDP and foreign bank presence should be positively 
signed and statistically significant at conventional levels. Empirical evidence presented 
in Table A.1 shows that foreign banks cannot be blamed of having amplified credit 
cycles in the region, a finding that is in line with that of Micco and Panizza (2006) and 
Arena et al. (2007). 
                                                 
30 As mentioned in the text, when a dummy for this country was introduced in the variance equation 
the estimated algorithm did not reach convergence. Indeed, it was decided to exclude such dummy 
variable. 
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In models (4)-(7) we include external or push factors that may have a burden on 
domestic lending patterns. In particular, we include the U.S. GDP and the Federal Funds 
Rate, as well as their interactions with foreign banks, to test the hypothesis that these 
institutions amplify foreign shocks. It is found that, while the U.S. GDP has a positive 
impact on credit, neither the Federal Funds Rate nor the interaction terms are 
statistically significant. The finding of a positive coefficient for the American GDP is 
consistent with Goldberg (2002) who observes that U.S. bank claims to Latin American 
countries increase as the U.S. economy grows. It should be noted however, that while 
the U.S. GDP is kept in the estimations because it is significant in this round, it will lose 
its explanatory power in subsequent models. 
Next, we include the fiscal balance, the spread between the lending and deposit rates, 
the degree of financial development, and the bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S. 
(models 8-11). From this set of variables, only the last two appear to be significant and 
were consequently kept in subsequent estimations. As noted in the main text, lagged 
degrees of financial development help boosting real private credit in the future. Also, 
increases in the real exchange rate (i.e. depreciations) have a negative impact on the 
level of credit, since they make more expensive the repayment of loans in foreign 
currency. Similar results for the region were found by Arena et al. (2007). 
In models (12)-(14) of Table A.2 we added banking variables to the econometric 
regressions: public and foreign bank presence, and the concentration of the banking 
system. None of these proved to be significant. Empirical evidence to date is 
inconclusive up to the impact of foreign banks on credit dynamism. Our results coincide 
with those of Detragiache et al. (2006) who found that foreign banks have no 
discernible effect on the level of credit granted by the system, once their sample of 
countries is expanded to include mid- and high-income countries. 
The next six models (15-20) include the occurrence of banking and currency crisis and 
their interactions with foreign and state-owned banks. While having the expected 
negative sign, the banking crisis dummy is not statistically significant. As explained in 
the text, this may be due to the fact that the impact of crises might be captured by 
movements in other macroeconomic variables. Concerning the interaction with foreign 
and state-owned banks, only the last one is positive and statistically significant. This 
means that state-owned banks help stabilizing credit levels during banking crisis 
periods, including a currency crisis dummy among the regressors gives a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient, while foreign and state-owned banks do not seem to 
exacerbate or buffer the impact of such events on credit behaviour. 
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Table 1: Currency and banking crisis in Latin America (1995:1-2001:4) 
Country Currency crisis Banking crisis 
Argentina  1995:1-1995:4 
  2001:1-2001:4 
Bolivia  1995:1-1995:4 
Brazil 1999:1 1995:1-1996:4 
 2001:2  
Colombia 1999:1 1998:1-1998:4 
Costa Rica  1995:1-1998:1 
Mexico 1995:1 1995:1-1996:4 
 1995:4  
Source: Author’s calculations, Carstens et al. (2004) and Caprio et al. (2005). 
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Table 2: Cross sectional dependence and panel unit root tests 
Variable Constant1 Constant plus trend2 CDlm
3 Z statistics4 
Real GDP X  121.5*** 1.5 
Real GDP  X 115.9*** -5.9*** 
Fiscal balance X  42.6** -2.5** 
Fiscal balance  X 45.3** -4.1*** 
Financial development X  27.4 -6.4*** 
Financial development  X 29.8 -7.1*** 
Real private lending X  63.8*** -3.7*** 
Real private lending  X 66.6*** -6.4*** 
Banking spread X  34.1 -2.9*** 
Banking spread  X 27.6 -5.8*** 
Real exchange rate X  64.6*** -3.0** 
Real exchange rate  X 70.9*** -8.1*** 
Foreign bank presence X  29.1 -1.3* 
Foreign bank presence  X 29.0 -4.1*** 
Public banks presence X  17.7 -2.9*** 
Public banks presence  X 21.6 -3.8*** 
Banking concentration X  27.8 -1.5* 
Banking concentration  X 30.2 -3.0*** 
Note 
1. Some variables contain a constant term. The remaining do not contain deterministics 
and are cantered. 
2. Some variables contain a constant term plus a trend. The remaining do not contain 
deterministics and are cantered. 
3. Breusch and Pagan's test for the null hypothesis of zero cross-sectional dependence. 
(***), (**) and (*) denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
4. Choi's panel unit root test, with and without cross sectional dependence according to 
the CDlm test result. The null is rejected at a significance level α  when zZ c α< , where 
zc α  is the lower tail of the standard normal distribution or the simulated critical vale, for 
the cases without and with cross section dependence, respectively.  The optimal number 
of lags included in each cross section ADF equation was determined using the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC). 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 3: The determinants of credit dynamics in Latin America (1995:1-2001:4) 
(dependent variable: HP adjusted real credit to the private sector)1 
Mean equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AR(1) 0.26 0.47*** 0.49*** 0.36** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 
 [1.30] [3.47] [4.02] [2.43] [4.07] [3.98] [3.62] [3.72] [3.70] [3.74] 
Real GDP (t-1) 0.88*** 0.68*** 0.74*** 0.79*** 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.84*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
 [3.56] [3.11] [3.28] [3.81] [3.21] [3.15] [3.96] [3.81] [3.85] [3.78] 
US GDP (t) 0.37          
 [0.53]          
Fed rate (t) -1.44          
 [-1.64]          
Fiscal balance (t-1) 0.80          
 [0.75]          
Spread (t-1) -2.63          
 [-0.99]          
Financial dev. (t-1) 1.28** 1.17** 0.83* 1.24** 0.84** 0.89** 1.13** 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.30*** 
 [2.06] [2.36] [1.89] [2.67] [1.94] [2.05] [2.67] [3.55] [3.62] [3.55] 
RER (t-1)2 -0.25** -0.20** -0.19** -0.20** -0.18** -0.20** -0.19** -0.20** -0.20** -0.20** 
 [-2.44] [-2.10] [-2.40] [-2.76] [-2.39] [-2.63] [-2.12] [-2.30] [-2.38] [-2.29] 
Public banks (t-1) -0.39          
 [-1.22]          
Foreign banks (t-1) 0.23          
 [0.65]          
Banking conc. (t-1) 0.55          
 [1.61]          
BC*PB (t)3 1.70*** 1.18** 1.17* 1.70** 1.18* 1.21* 1.54* 1.51** 1.53** 1.49** 
 [3.56] [2.72] [1.79] [2.64] [1.70] [1.86] [1.99] [2.11] [2.19] [2.10] 
Currency crisis (t) -5.45* -4.59** -4.99 -5.16 -4.95 -5.22*** -5.47* -5.71** -5.59** -5.76** 
 [-1.76] [-2.03] [-1.61] [-1.63] [-1.60] [-4.15] [-1.92] [-2.18] [-2.15] [-2.17] 
Chow test for absence of FE in mean equation4 
F test 1.68 1.56         
(p-value) 0.15 0.18         
Chow test for poolability of the data5 
F test 1.62 2.64         
(p-value) 0.95 0.99         
 
1. Robust t-statistics are reported between brackets. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
2. RER = real exchange rate. 
3. BC = banking crisis; PB = public banks. 
4. The null hypothesis is absence of fixed effects in a mean equation estimated by OLS. 
5. The null hypothesis is that the data are poolable in a mean equation estimated by OLS. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 4: The determinants of credit dynamics in Latin America (1995:1-2001:4) 
(dependent variable: credit volatility)1 
Variance equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant 9.64*** 10.89*** 2.01*** 2.07*** 2.01*** 2.03*** 2.03*** 2.06*** 2.08*** 2.06*** 
 [5.72] [6.59] [12.07] [12.03] [12.04] [12.01] [11.01] [12.08] [11.55] [11.80] 
ARCH(1) 0.28* 0.21* 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 [1.87] [1.71] [1.08] [0.84] [1.11] [1.07] [1.22] [0.75] [0.52] [0.68] 
BC (t)   1.18*** 1.07*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.22*** 1.06*** 1.02** 1.06*** 
   [3.26] [2.88] [3.14] [3.19] [3.03] [2.86] [2.72] [2.85] 
BC*FB (t)2    -0.33       
    [-1.40]       
BC*Public banks (t)     0.07      
     [0.32]      
Currency crisis (t)      -2.91     
      [-0.45]     
Foreign banks (t-1)       -0.24** -0.20** -0.20** -0.19** 
       [-2.49] [-2.22] [-2.14] [-2.10] 
Financial dev. (t-1)        -0.26** -0.25** -0.26** 
        [-2.07] [-2.05] [-2.08] 
Banking conc. (t-1)         -0.03  
         [-0.34]  
Public banks (t-1)          0.02 
          [0.20] 
Chow test for absence of FE in conditional variance equation3 
F test 2.47 3.51         
(p-value) 0.04 0.01         
F test for ARCH(1) effects in conditional variance4 
F test 13.25 2.76         
(p-value) 0.00 0.099         
F test for ARCH(4) effects in conditional variance4 
F test 10.21 6.33         
(p-value) 0.00 0.00         
Diagnostics           
Log-likelihood -338.5 -363.2 -356.3 -355.2 -356.2 -354.3 -353.3 -349.4 -349.3 -349.4 
Normality test (KS) 
(p-value)5 
0.72 0.50 0.89 1.00 0.88 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.97 
BG(1) (p-value)6 0.84 0.59 0.47 0.70 0.53 0.45 0.70 0.14 0.18 0.15 
BG(4) (p-value) 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.15 0.16 0.16 
ARCH(1) (p-value)7 0.29 0.51 0.54 0.45 0.53 0.45 0.70 1.00 0.98 0.98 
ARCH(4) (p-value) 0.61 0.82 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 
1. Robust t-statistics are reported between brackets. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
2. BC = banking crisis; FB = foreign banks. 
3. The null hypothesis is absence of fixed effects in the variance equation. The model considered is an ARCH(1). 
4. The null hypothesis is the absence of ARCH effects. 
5. Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test computed on the standardized residuals. 
6. Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation computed on the standardized residuals. 
7. Auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity test computed on the standardized residuals. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 1: Foreign bank participation in emerging countries, by region 
(share of total banking assets) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 2: Foreign banks in Latin America 
(share over total credit) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 3: Banking concentration 
(share top 3 banks on total credits) 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table A.1: The determinants of credit dynamics in Latin America (1995:1-2001:4) (dependent variable: HP adjusted real 
credit to the private sector)1 
Mean equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AR(1) 0.80*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.59*** 
 [23.94] [18.14] [17.89] [18.36] [18.66] [18.10] [18.00] [18.56] [17.39] [7.39] 
Real GDP (t-1)  0.55*** 0.55*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.58*** 
  [3.71] [3.62] [3.36] [3.08] [3.16] [3.21] [3.33] [3.07] [3.93] 
GDP * FB (t-1)   0.02        
   [0.57]        
US GDP (t)    0.81* 0.86* 0.80* 0.85* 0.80* 0.77* 1.09** 
    [1.80] [1.90] [1.75] [1.89] [1.76] [1.66] [2.42] 
US GDP * FB (t)     0.05      
     [0.48]      
Fed rate (t)      0.34 0.40    
      [0.47] [0.54]    
Fed rate * FB (t)       -0.07    
       [-0.37]    
Fiscal bal. (t-1)        -0.39   
        [-0.73]   
Spread (t-1)         0.32  
         [0.20]  
Fin. dev. (t-1)          1.16*** 
          [3.27] 
Variance equation 
Constant 8.78*** 11.47*** 11.46*** 10.56*** 10.22*** 10.61*** 10.46*** 10.64*** 10.97*** 10.41*** 
 [8.52] [10.11] [10.03] [9.89] [9.44] [9.88] [9.73] [9.84] [9.61] [9.86] 
ARCH(1) 1.10*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.30*** 
 [7.62] [2.65] [2.65] [2.82] [2.84] [2.79] [2.83] [2.77] [2.74] [2.61] 
Chow test for absence of FE in mean equation2 
F test 0.40 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.36 0.60 0.34 
(p-value) 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.92 0.75 0.93 
Chow test for poolability of the data3 
F test 1.63 1.58 1.36 1.26 1.12 1.15 1.00 1.15 1.40 1.17 
(p-value) 0.93 0.94 0.88 0.81 0.69 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.92 0.75 
Chow test for absence of FE in conditional variance equation4 
F test 3.36 2.88 2.86 2.96 2.96 2.98 2.98 3.73 2.69 3.06 
(p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
F test for ARCH(1)  effects in conditional variance5 
F test 3.13 4.85 5.49 8.45 8.54 9.57 8.62 0.97 11.70 7.05 
(p-value) 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.01 
Diagnostics           
Log-likelihood -648.7 -586.5 -586.5 -584.3 -584.1 -584.2 -584.0 -557.3 -565.4 -569.0 
Normality test6 0.07 0.20 0.25 0.40 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.43 0.28 
BG(1) (p-value)7 0.17 0.40 0.42 0.34 0.29 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.43 
BG(4) (p-value) 0.33 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.16 0.08 
ARCH(1) (p-value)8 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.88 
ARCH(4) (p-value) 0.61 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.25 
 
1. Robust t-statistics are reported between brackets. (*), (**) and (***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
     respectively. 
2. The null hypothesis is absence of fixed effects in a mean equation estimated by OLS. 
3. The null hypothesis is that the data are poolable in a mean equation estimated by OLS. 
4. The null hypothesis is absence of fixed effects in the variance equation. The model considered is an ARCH(1). 
5. The null hypothesis is the absence of ARCH effects. 
6. Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test computed on the standardized residuals. 
7. Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation computed on the standardized residuals. 
8. Auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity test computed on the standardized residuals. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table A.2: The determinants of credit dynamics in Latin America (1995:1-2001:4) (dependent variable: HP adjusted real credit to 
the private sector) 
 
Mean equation (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
AR (1) 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 
 [4.63] [3.59] [4.63] [4.23] [5.15] [5.44] [4.02] [4.07] [4.18] [4.31] 
Real GDP (t-1) 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 
 [4.85] [3.90] [4.91] [4.87] [4.07] [3.80] [3.28] [3.13] [3.11] [3.19] 
US GDP (t) 0.97*** 0.67 0.98*** 0.97*** 1.04*** 1.02 0.78 0.69 0.68 0.76 
 [2.06] [1.04] [2.06] [2.03] [2.22] [2.18] [1.31] [1.21] [1.20] [1.33] 
Fin. dev. (t-1) 1.52*** 1.03*** 1.54*** 1.60*** 1.52*** 1.42*** 1.05*** 1.16*** 1.15*** 1.10*** 
 [4.32] [2.51] [4.47] [4.83] [4.33] [3.72] [2.59] [2.56] [2.59] [2.46] 
RER (t-1) -0.22*** -0.16** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.08 -0.18* -0.19* -0.16 
 [-3.33] [-1.94] [-3.35] [-3.51] [-2.87] [-2.71] [-0.93] [-1.78] [-1.81] [-1.54] 
PB (t-1)  -0.28         
  [-1.07]         
FB (t-1)   -0.05        
   [-0.40]        
Bank conc. (t-1)    -0.18       
    [-1.32]       
BC (t)     -0.62 -0.51 -1.23    
     [-0.72] [-0.57] [-1.10]    
BC * FB (t)      0.26     
      [0.58]     
BC * PB (t)       1.21*** 1.14*** 1.13*** 1.13*** 
       [2.89] [2.62] [2.59] [2.61] 
Currency crisis (t)        -4.36** -4.49 -3.80* 
        [-2.05] [-0.85] [-1.88] 
CC * FB (t)         0.18  
         [0.10]  
CC * PB (t)          0.52 
          [0.43] 
Variance equation 
Constant 10.36*** 11.51*** 10.33*** 10.44*** 10.28*** 10.18*** 10.85*** 10.67*** 10.61*** 10.4***8 
 [9.63] [7.21] [9.59] [9.62] [9.43] [9.39] [5.74] [6.21] [6.16] [6.05] 
ARCH(1) 0.25*** 0.28** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.23 0.22* 0.22* 0.23* 
 [2.55] [2.03] [2.55] [2.46] [2.54] [2.56] [1.52] [1.75] [1.77] [1.76] 
Chow test for absence of FE in mean equation 
F test 0.34 0.76 0.34 0.33 0.47 0.52 1.41 1.60 1.55 1.61 
(p-value) 0.94 0.58 0.93 0.94 0.86 0.82 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.16 
Chow test for poolability of the data 
F test 1.44 1.43 1.55 1.23 2.15 2.62 46.63 2.33 1.92 1.92 
(p-value) 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 
Chow test for absence of FE in conditional variance equation 
F test 2.92 6.59 2.87 2.91 3.12 2.80 3.46 3.65 3.62 3.65 
(p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F test for ARCH effects in conditional variance 
F test 12.73 8.90 11.88 17.63 0.11 0.51 0.00 3.24 3.23 3.25 
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.48 0.95 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Diagnostics           
Log-likelihood -564.4 -384.6 -564.2 -564.0 -542.8 -543.63 -364.4 -362.5 -362.4 -362.1 
Normality test 0.32 0.52 0.35 0.41 0.31 0.39 0.72 0.51 0.54 0.62 
BG(1) (p-value) 0.43 0.71 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.54 0.63 0.60 0.62 
BG(4) (p-value) 0.02 0.84 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.05 
ARCH(1) (p-value)  0.72 0.27 0.69 0.61 0.84 0.85 0.74 0.51 0.50 0.49 
ARCH(4) (p-value) 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.33 0.30 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.86 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
